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REFERRAL SYSTEMS AMD HEALTH-CARE-SEEKING BEHAVIOUR OF PATTENTS: 
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
G.M. Mwabu 
Abstract 
The paper studies medical re ferral systems o f developing 
countries in relation to patients ' health-care-seeking behaviour. It 
is shown that the vert ica l re ferra l structures are consistent with 
patients' cost-minimizing behaviour in their search o f medical treatments. 
This consistency is a consequence o f a common desire among patients and 
health planners, to minimize costs o f treating i l lnesses so as to get the 
most from their limited resources. The conditions under which the medical 
referral system ref lects treatment seeking behaviour o f patients are 
specified. Since these conditions do not hold exactly in the real world, 
the referral system has some major weaknesses as a model o f how national 
health service delivery systems actually function. Reforms that can be 
undertaken to rectify these weaknesses are suggested. 
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1 Introduction 
The hierarchical re ferra l health care system is a key component 
of national health care systems o f v i r tua l ly a l l developing countries. A 
pervasive characteristic o f national health care systems o f these countries, 
is a pyramid-like structure o f health ins t i tu t i ons , through which basic and 
tertiary health services are provided ( in pr inc ip le ) to everyone. Typically, 
the apex of this structure consists o f a national hospital and medical 
research institutions, while i t s base comprises small scale health fac i l i -
ties - the dispensaries and health centres. In-between the apex and the 
base, are the district and regional hospitals . 
The most striking aspect o f the organizational structure of the 
health system just described, is i t s re ferra l system. This system, the 
hierarchical referral structure, permits movement o f patients or their 
problems, from the base o f the national health care system to i ts apex and 
the vice-versa. The movement o f patients (or the i r problems), in the 
referral system is intended to be in i t ia ted by the health professionals who 
manage the national health care system. But in actual pract i ce , patients 
or their relatives, do move themselves up or down this system. 
This paper has three main aims. F i r s t l y , i t demonstrates that 
the referral health care system, as characterized by a hierarchical structure 
of health fac i l i t ies , is simply an organizational image o f the cost minimi-
zing behaviour of patients in the i r attempts to cure i l lnesses . Unless this 
is so, the referral system cannot work as intended on a voluntary basis, 
i .e. , without a force external to i t that would compel patients to move 
step-by-step through its hierarchical l eve l s . Secondly, the paper i l lust -
rates with empirical data from Kenya that even though the public referral 
system mimics the cost-minimizing behaviour o f patients in the ir search of 
cure, i t does not function as desired for two main reasons: 
(a) The public referral system is typ i ca l ly erected under the false premise 
that patients do not have alternative sources o f medical care; this 
assumption often leads to under-ut i l izat ion o f the re ferra l f a c i l i t i e s . 
(b) Patients have considerable consumer sovereignity in deciding the level 
of the national health care system from which to seek treatment. 
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That i s , they can ignor? the advice o f the health professionals regarding 
referrals"1. Patients' autonomy in choice o f source o f treatment often 
leads to over-utilization of re ferra l f a c i l i t i e s . 
Lastly, the paper suggests ways of altering the public referral 
systems of the developing countries to improve their performance, 
II Historic->1 Origins o ' Referral Health Care systems in Developing 
Countries 
The referral health care systems in many developing countries 
are creatures of the Brit ish co lonial administration, The idea of 
dispensaries and health centres , as a l i n e o f f i r s t contact of a national 
health care system with pat ients , was conceived by Lord Dawson in the 
1920s. In 19^0s, the organizational structure o f dispensaries and health 
centres was introduced in India, Egypt, Tunisia and the Sudan. 
Rex Fendall, the former Director o f Medical services in Kenya 
during colonial administration, was instrumental in implementing the 
referral health care system in Kenya in the la te 19^0s and early 1950s. 
According to Fendall (1963: 980) , in a resource poor country, the "referral 
system is the only way to supply health serv ice at a modest level to all 
the people and yet to provide, at the same time, the highest standard of 
care to those in urgent need." Fendall' s claim w i l l be examined at great 
length in this paper. 
III Referral System as a model of Patients' Behaviour 
Health planners, as suppliers o f medical and health services, 
are faced with a problem o f resource scarc i ty . That i s , they have insuff i -
cient manpower, medical supplies , equipment and other inputs to provide 
basic he 1th care to everyone. This problem is part icular ly acute in the 
developing countries. Faced with this problem, the health planner, whose 
purpose will be assumed to be miximization o f coverage o f population with 
basic health services, must use the scarce resources available to him wisely. 
Resource use is ''wise" when i t i s in accordance with economic rules of 
allocative and operational e f f i c i e n c y which ensure provision ofygood or a 
service in the most c o s t - e f f e c t i v e manner, i . e . in the least costly way. 
This is in sharp contrast to their lack o f autonomy in deciding the 
form of treatment to get once they are at the source o f medical care. 
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It is important at this point to bear in mind that c o s t - e f f e c t i veness 
in the delivery of basic health services is achieved within a particular 
organizational structure o f health ins t i tut i ons . Di f ferent organizational 
structures (or delivery systems), entai l d i f f e r e n t (minimum) costs of 
delivering the same package o f basic health services . The del ivery system 
with the lowest cost ( i . e . with the minimum o f the minimum cos ts ) i s the 
cost-effective health service del ivery system. That i s , i t i s the organi-
zational structure that would maximize the proportion o f the population 
covered with basic health services under certain resource constraints."1" 
The preceding discussion indicates that in a resource poor 
country, health planners would design a health care del ivery system that 
minimizes the cost of treating i l l n e s s e s (or o f providing basic health 
services). Under certain conditions ( to be spe l t out l a t e r ) , the 
hierarchical refr^ral system minimizes the cost o f treat ing or preventing 
common illnesss of a population. This i s because under a v e r t i c a l 
referral system, illnesses are f i r s t seen at dispensaries and. health 
centres, which, due to their simple technology o f medical care , are very 
. . . . 2 cheap fac i l i t ies for treating i l l n e s s e s . Only when i l l n e s s e s cannot be 
treated at dispensaries or health centres , are they re ferred to hospitals 
for more expensive treatment. Since most o f the i l lnesses that a f f l i c t 
the majority of the population in the developing countries are preventable 
(and can be treated by .paramedics), the v e r t i c a l r e f e r r a l system i s a 
cost-effective way of providing basic health services in those countries. 
It should be cmphas ized that the system assumes that patients w i l l f i rs t 
visit health units before they progressively move up to the more sophisticated 
and expensive units for fol low-up care. 
It should be noted that as more resources become ava i lab le , the popula-
tion health coverage increases , unt i l everyone i s able to enjoy basic 
health services of a part i cu lar qual i ty . Once population i s ful ly 
covered with basic serv i ces , further increases in health resources are 
used to improve the qual i ty o f the services provided. We make the 
assumption that the population i s never sat iated with qual ity health 
services. 
Health care technology at the dispensaries and health centres is simple 
and low cost. Paramedics and simple medical equipment are used to pro-
vide both curative r~nd preventive health serv ices . I t i s important here 
not to confuse simple care with low qual i ty care. 
mm . 
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The question now is whether patients bel ieve (as health 
planners/professionals do) that in the event of i l l n e s s , they should 
first seek medical attention from the f a c i l i t i e s that forir. the base of 
the referral system, and only move up that system, when adviced to do so 
by radical personnel. To see whether in seeking treatment, patients 
actually behave as health planners expect them to do, wc need t o examine 
their economic behaviour as consumers of medical serv ices . 
Recall that in providing health services t o a population, the 
planner acts under conditions of resource scarc i ty . Similar ly , in using 
the public health services provided by the planner, the patient or his 
relative, must face the problem o f resource scarc i ty . The time and finan-
cial resources that can be used to obtain medical services from public 
or private health fac i l i t i e s can also be used to acquire other goods and 
services which, like medical care , also y i e ld u t i l i t y t o the patient. 
Such goods or services include c lothing , food , housing and so forth. If 
the patient (or his relative) can save part of the health budget, then 
he can buy more of other things which he also needs in addition t o medical 
care. Thus, like the planner, the patient can be assumed to act so as 
to minimize the cost of treating a given i l l n e s s . I t fol lows therefore, 
that cost minimizing patients w i l l f i r s t seek treatment frpm health 
facil it ies at the base of the re f e r ra l system, i . e . , from dispensaries 
and health centres. This i s because the cost of treatment there i s lower 
than in referral fac i l i t i es . Hence, as the r e f e r r a l model suggests , cost 
minimizing patients would seek medical carp from re ferra l f a c i l i t i e s 
(hospitals) only i f they canrot get acceptable treatment from non-referral 
faci l it ies (dispensaries or health centres) . 
The result of our analysis so far is important enough to warrant 
emphasis: the assumption that both health planners and patients attempt to 
minimize the cost of curing or preventing i l l n e s s e s , leads them (without 
consulting each other) to prefer a common mode o f health services delivery, 
i .e . the referral system. I t is as i f , in erecting the hierarchical 
referral faci l i t ies (as a service delivery system), the health planner 
transforms patients' unrevealed ideas of how/ to" seek medical treatments 
into an orpanizational structure of health inst i tut ions . 
I ' . 
• ' 
• • 
• ; • ' 
; 
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• 
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Alternatively, since patients' actual responses to i l lnesses are governed 
by their perceptions of how best t o deal with i l l n e s s e s , the re ferra l 
system can also be viewed as a transformation of health-care-seeking 
behaviour of cost minimizing patients into a ver t i ca l l y ordered orraniza-
tional structure of health f a c i l i t i e s . 
It should now be noted that the re f e r ra l system as a model of 
patients' health-care-seeking behaviour rests on some very stringent 
assumptions, namely: 
1. Patients, like health planners, are cost minimizers, that i s , 
they minimize the cost of achieving a certain leve l of benefit 
derivable from consumption of health services . 
2. The health f a c i l i t i e s at d i f f erent levels of the r e f e r ra l systems 
are substitutes in the treatment of common i l lnesses . For 
in 
example, a malaria casB can either be treated /an outpatient 
department of a National Hospital , or in an outpatient department 
of a rural health centre or dispensary. 
3. Costs of treatment are higher f o r everyone at re ferra l fac i l i t ies . 
The quality of service at non-referral f a c i l i t i e s is acceptable to 
patients. 
5. Patients are well informed about types of health services available 
at different levels o f / r e f e r r a l system. 
Health professionals have power to create demand for their own 
services; or equivalently, patients cannot bypass one level of a 
referral system to the next, without consent of the health per-
sonnel at the leve l that they "/Eypassing. 
The public health care system is the only source of medical care 
available to th» patient. 
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I f the above assumptions wore to hold, the re ferra l system would 
f i t in a strikingly remarkable way, the actual health-care-seekinp be-
haviour of patients. Unfortunately, these assumotions rarely hold. Implicit 
in assumption 1, is the condition that patients , as consumers of medical 
services, maximize a non-prdbabil istic u t i l i t y function. I f , however, pa-
tients maximize an expected u t i l i t y funct ion, a two-parameter u t i l i t y 
function ajfa Tobin (1958), then the p o s s i b i l i t y of them wishing to use 
different levels of the re ferra l system for a piven i l l n e s s ar ises . In that 
case, the referral system would be an incorrect model o f how patients seek 
treatment in the event of sickness. I t would not capture patients ' tendency 
to want to use referral f a c i l i t i e s in conjunction with non-referral ones. 
For some i l lnesses , assumption 2 would not hold, and hence 
patients would not visit only the cheapest source of treatment. Failure of 
assumptions 3 - 6 to hold would lead to bypass of health f a c i l i t i e s by 
patients. Assumption 7 ensures that patients wishinp t o seek follow-up care 
after initial visits in publ ic c l i n i c s w i l l do so in the publ ic referral 
system. This hcwever may not be so i f other sources of medical care exist. 
The next section discusses empirical evidence that i s used to 
examine the proposition that the re ferra l system i s a pood model o f how 
patients actually seek treatment in the event of i l lness . The proposition 
holds i f patients f i rst v i s i t the c losest health f a c i l i t i e s , and only move 
to distant ones when fa i l t o pet cured by the ir i n i t i a l treatments. 
IV Empirical Evidence 
a) Introduction 
Field research on health f a c i l i t y u t i l i z a t i o n in developinp 
countries shows that patients tend to seek treatment from c loses t health 
faci l it ies. See for example, Akin e t al ( 19 85 ) , Conly (1975) , Mbithi and 
Rasmussen (1977) and Mwabu (19 84). In the i r i n i t i a l attempts to cure 
illnesses, most patients v i s i t dispensaries and health centres - precisely 
the health institutions that form the base of the re ferra l health system. 
In the majority of developing countr ies , money prices of medical services 
m these faci l it ies are either t o t a l l y or heavily subsidized by revenue from 
general taxation. 
k . 
- 7 -
Furhter, in comparison with other sources o f modern health care, dispen-
saries and health centres are re la t ive ly c loser to peoples ' homes, and hence 
the time cost of travelling to these f a c i l i t i e s i s not as great as to 
alternative nodes of medical treatments. Thus the t o t a l cost ( in terms of ; 
money and time considerations) o f receiving medical care from dispensaries 
and health centres is generally lower than the cost o f treatment in the 
competing health institutions such as the hospitals and private clinics. See 
Mwabu (1985) for an i l lustration o f d i f ferences in medical care costs in 
rural health faci l i t ies in Kenya. 
In brief, patients' tendency to v i s i t the c losest (cheapest) health 
faci l it ies fro medical attention, provides strong j u s t i f i c a t i o n for the 
hypothesis that patients act so as to minimize the cost o f treating a given 
illness. Hence, the referral model, according to which patients should 
seek initial medical care from the simplest (cheapest) health units of a 
national health care system, i s a good description o f pat ients ' health-care-
seeking behaviour. Nonetheless, the available empirical evidence, also 
indicates that patients' bypass o f the simple units of the hierarchical 
national systems of health care i s quite common. 
b) Patients' bypass of health f a c i l i t i e s 
Patients' bypass o f the c l o ses t health f a c i l i t i e s has been 
documented in considerable detai l in one o f the Rural Health Units (Divisions 
in Kenya (see Mwabu 1984), pp. 56-67). The set o f tables that follow 
display various aspects o f health f a c i l i t y bypass by patients. 
In the particular case i l lustrated by table 1 , i t can be seen that 
patients did not necessarily v i s i t the c l oses t health f a c i l i t y . For example, 
of the patients who sought treatment in government c l i n i c s in the f irst round 
of visits , 37 of them, or 27 percent, did not v i s i t the c loses t government 
clinic. As can be seen from table 1 , the percentage o f the patients bypassing 
the closest government c l i n i c got larger as the i l l n e s s period became longer. 
• . • 
' ' ' ' 
• ' • . • '' : : 
• • 
• . 
: 
Table 1: Bypassing of c losest f a c i l i t y of a piven class f o r other 
faci l it ies in that c lass 
Type of faci l ity or 
Provider bypassed i 
Per cent of Patients 
• 
I 
1 -i -
First Visit 
t 
i 
j. Second Vis i t t t 
Third Visit' 
; 
» Govt. Health Centre 
or Dispensary 
J 
t 27 
(37) 
T 
f. 
i 
18.5 
(12) 
t t> 36 
(9) 
Mission Clinic 24.0 
(33) ! 
: 43.6 
(44) 
42.6 
: (20) ' 
t '. 
Private Clinic 
i i 
i 
i . 
I 
26 
(2 ) 
1 43. 8 
(4 ) 
[ 56.3 \ 
: (s» j 
! Govt. Hospital 
* I i 
i
i 
! 
14. 3 
(2) 
25.0 
(4) 
30.8 \ 
< } 
! j 
j Pharmacy/shop 
! 
i 
i • 23. 8 (30) 
20.0 
(7) 
t 
t 
22.2 
: (4) 
f * • 
. Traditional Healer f' 51.6 
(16) 
t- -
50.0 
(9 ) 
41.7 
(5) 
2 ' * ' 
NOTE: The figures in parentheses are numbers of patients who bypassed 
the closest provider in a given class of providers. 
Source: Mwabu (1984), p. 56 
This is also the case in non-government health f a c i l i t i e s . However, the actual 
number of patients who bypassed the c losest f a c i l i t y became progressively 
smaller as the period of i l lness increased. This i s because in each period, 
patients recovered and exited the health care system. In general, as the 
number of visits (number of attempts to cure i l l n e s s ) increases , the bypass 
rate first rises and them declines. I t should be noted that the results dis-
played in table 1 generally lack s t a t i s t i c a l r e l i a b i l i t y because the sample 
sizes involved are quite small. Nonetheless, the results are important because 
they illustrate the phenomenon of patients ' bypass of health units in a health 
care system characterized by re ferra l f a c i l i t i e s . 
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Table 2: A comparison of the to ta l number o f patients bypassing the 
closest facility in a riven class of f a c i l i t i e s and the number 
of patients attending the c losest f a c i l i t i e s in other classes 
after the( bypa^i ' ^ ^ " ' ___ . 
CLass of facil ity 
bypassed 
Number bypassing 'No. going to c losest Per cent 
(out of 422) c l i n i c in other 
classes 
Government clinics 
Mission clinics 
Private clinics 
Government 
Hospitals 
Pharmacies/shops 
Traditional 
Healers 
122 
45 
128 
166 
280 
118 
42 
125 
16 2 
16 e 
96.7 • 
93,3 . 
97.6 
97.6 
95.6 
Source: Mwabu (19 84), p. 5 8 
Table 2 is interesting because i t emphasizes patients ' tendency 
to seek treatment from the c losest f a c i l i t i e s . As can be seen from the 
table, after bypassing a particular class of c l i n i c s , e . g . government 
clinics, patients generally sought treatment from the c l i n i c of other 
classes of health fac i l i t ies that was c losest to them. Expectation of 
better quality of service from the next health f a c i l i t y , or lack of drugs 
from the closest c l inic , were the two most commonly mentioned reasons for 
bypassing the nearest health unit. 
The data in tables 1 and 2 show two con f l i c t ing behavioural 
tendencies of patients in the i r search of cure: a strong tendency to seek 
treatment from the nearest health f a c i l i t y and a rather weak but persistent 
countervailing tendency to bypass the nearest c l i n i c . As already mentioned, 
patients bypass a health f a c i l i t y when they consider i t s services to be of 
insufficient quality. Thus, the health f a c i l i t i e s bypass can be attributed 
to perceived inadequacies in health serv ices . 
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It is this phenomenon, the health f a c i l i t y bypass, that weakens the 
-redictive power of the vert ica l re ferra l model regarding patients ' 
hea1th-care-seeking behaviour. 
V Reffrral System as a normative model o f a National Health Care 
Delivery 'System V J ^ V ' ^ ' 
In the previous sec t i on , i t was demonstrated that in the absence 
of the bypass phenomenon, the hierarchical re ferra l system, f i t s quite well, 
the actual health-care-seekinR behaviour of patients. In other words, the 
referral system is a positive model of patients' economic behaviour in their 
search for medical treatments. Further, the data presented in the previous 
section, indicates that the bypass phenomenon only weakens the predictive 
power of the referral system (as a model of patients ' behaviour) , but does 
not make i t invalid. 
The normative question posed in this sect ion i s : should a national 
health care delivery system of a developing country be organized according 
to the structure of health inst i tut ions implied by the ver t i ca l referral 
system? Or equivaltntly, does the re f e r ra l health care system describe 
the organizational structure o f health inst i tut ions which ought to exist in a 
developing country such as Kenya? 
In a resource poor country, a ver t i ca l organizational structure 
of health institutions provides the health planner with an opportunity to 
achieve two important health care goals. F i rs t , such a structure makes i t 
possible to cover a large number of people with some medical care. This is 
because simple health institutions ( e . g . dispensaries) are easy to afford 
since they use local resources in tens ive ly ) , and can therefore be built in 
large numbers. Second, through the r e f e r ra l system, i t i s possible to provide 
high quality care both to those who can af ford t o pay f or i t , and to those 
who cannot afford such care, but are deemed to be in great need f o r i t . 
Poor patients, once identi f ied, can be r e f e r ra l t o high quality health 
facil ities for free treatment. Thus, under a r e f e r ra l health care delivery 
system, i t is possible to charge market prices f o r medical services without 
excluding anyone from medical care. Since user fees tend t o discourage 
internal inefficiency in health care delivery (Carl Stevens, 1984 and others) 
a referral system would be conducive t o both e f f i c i e n c y and equity in medical 
care. 

From a theoretical perspect ive, a re ferra l system provides a very 
convincing description of an organizational arrangement o f health institu-
tions that ought to exist in resource poor countries. That i s , i t is an 
appropriate model of how health del ivery systems in such countries ought to 
be organized. 
We will now match th is theoret ical perspective with empirical 
evidence. Specifically, we w i l l match i t with the evidence regarding the 
known effects of referral systems on e f f i c i e n c y and equity. 
VI Empirical Evidence once again 
The key question to be answered in this section i s deceptively 
simple: Are the referral health care delivery systems in developing countries 
eff icient and/or equitable? 
There is much anecdotal evidence regarding the performance of 
referral health care systems in developing countries. These systems are 
known to be characterized by considerable internal i n e f f i c i e n c i e s . The 
symptoms of this inef f ic iency include over-loaded re ferra l f a c i l i t i e s ; un-
maintained medical equipment; unmotivated health personnel; misuse or 
shortages of drugs; mismanagement o f transport f a c i l i t i e s , among others. As 
a result of these inef f i c iency problems, the quality and quantity of health 
services delivered by health care systems of the developing countries, is 
believed to be far below what i s possible with the available health resources. 
As already stated, hard data on the .issues just raised are rare. However, 
in the case of Kenya, there i s considerable amount o f data on utilization of 
referral faci l i t ies (e .g . d i s t r i c t and provincial hosp i ta ls ) . Table 3 
below shows numbers of re-attendances to health f a c i l i t i e s in Kenya, and the 
numberrs of re-attendances referred to higher l eve ls of the referral system. 
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In interpreting table 3, we make the fol lowing three assumptions. 
First, since the data are for d i s t r i c t s , a l l the re ferra ls are to district 
hospitals. Second, there are no horizontal r e f e r r a l s , i . e . there are no 
referrals from one district hospital t o another; a l l re ferra ls are vertical, 
that i s , from health centres or dispensaries to d i s t r i c t hospitals. Third, 
the majority of the re-attendance cases are from health centres and dis-
pensaries, and when necessary, these are referred to d i s t r i c t hospitals. 
Table 3: Re-attendances and re ferra ls to Government health fa c i l i t i e s in 
selected Districts in Kenya, January - March 1987 
District Re-at tendances or Referrals Referrals as per 
Re -v i s i t s cent of Re-atten-
dances 
Embu 10249 3 1543 1.5 
Machakos 974 29 10861 11.1 
Kitui 600 33 916 1.5 I 
Meru 151495 2029 1-4. 
Isiolo 11697 216 1.8 
Marsabit 7295 46 0.6f 
Kiambu 75 274 2683 3.6 
Kirinyaga 10539 7 4 306 4.1', 
Murang' a 84181 3234 3. 8. 
Nyandarua 88132 2399 2.1 
Nyeri 288290 6046 
/ 
Source: Health Information System, Ministry o f Health, Kenya. 
\ 
r 
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Given the above assumptions, i t can he seen from table 3, that 
only a very small proportion o f patients who re-attend health centres or 
dispensaries is referred by health professionals t o d i s t r i c t hospitals. 
(19 84 ) 
This result is consistent with that obtained by Mwabu/m a study of patients' 
treatment strategies in a rural d i s t r i c t in Kenya. In that study, it was 
found that the probability of a patient v i s i t ing a Government hospital after 
re-attending a Government health centre or dispensary was quite small 
(about 0.055. See'ftwabu, 19P4 p. 62). In other words only about 5.5 per 
cent of the patients who re-attended Government health centres or 
dispensaries visited Government hospitals f o r fol low-up care. The re-
maining 94. 5 per cent sought re f e r ra l or follow-up care from non-government 
faci l i t ies . The same was true of patients who sought i n i t i a l treatment in a 
Government hospital after se l f -d iagnos is of the ir health problems. These 
are patients who bypassed health centres and dispensaries and sought 
treatment from the closest Government hospital . Only about. 9.3 per cent 
of such patients, sought treatment from a re f e r ra l government health 
facility. The rest - 90.7 per cent - sought treatment from non-government 
facil it ies. 
The data on ut i l i zat ion of re ferra l f a c i l i t i e s suggest that these 
faci l it ies are used predominantly by non-referral patients. The congestion 
of patients at the hospitals is due, to a large extent, to the presence 
pf patients there who can be treated successful ly at lower l eve l fac i l i t ies . 
In short, the problem of over -ut i l i za t ion of hospital services i s due to 
the fact that the referral system is not functioning as desired. This is 
partly due to the phenomenon o f patients ' bypass of health f a c i l i t i e s , and 
partly a result of under-pricing of hospital services . Since hospital 
service is of better quality than dispensary se rv i ce , a patient w i l l choose 
to use a hospital i f its service costs the same as that o f the dispensary; 
for example, i f both of the services are free . In b r i e f , the referral 
health care delivery systems of the developing countries do not function 
efficiently because, among other thinps, they are overcrowded by patients 
who do not need referral medical care. They (the r e f e r r a l systems of 
developing countries) are a lso inequitable because they tend to be urban-
biased. By design, the re ferra l f a c i l i t i e s are located in the urban 
areas, where also, 60-80 per cent o f the most qual i f i ed medical personnel 
(the doctors, dentists, pharmacists etc . ) work. Thus, the re f e r ra l 
\ 
. . .. . ' - . . . • . ' '-..-;; 
• 
• 
• 
• 
facil ities end up benefiting urban residents disproportionately more than 
the rural copulations. To summarize, the re ferra l systems o f the developing 
countries fall short of expectations regarding the i r e f f i c i e n c y and 
equity in health services del ivery. 
VII Syntheses and Discussion 
This paper has examined the hierarchical re ferra l health care 
system, both as a positive model o f patients ' health-care-seeking behaviour, 
and also as a normative model of a national health care delivery system in 
a resource poor country. The novelty of the paper i s in demonstrating 
that the organizational structure o f a re ferral health care system is a 
physical model of how cost-minimizing patients would seek treatment under 
certain conditions (see assumptions 1 -7 , pp 6 -7 ) . When these conditions 
hold, the referral system also turns out to be a good description of how a 
national health care delivery system ought to be organized to achieve goals 
of efficiency and equity in the provision o f health services . 
In democratic countries where governments respect consumer 
(patients') preferences, the e f fec t iveness o f a r e f e r ra l health care system 
depends on how well i t r e f l e c t s patients ' behaviour in their search of 
cure. 
It has been shown in the paper that re ferra l health care systems 
are appropriate organizations of health services delivery in developing 
countries. However, the systems need to be reformed t o make them more 
equitable, and to increase their e f f i c i e n c y . The needed reforms are as 
follows: 
An increase in costs o f using services of re ferra l fac i l i t i es . 
Abolition of outpatient departments in re ferra l f a c i l i t i e s -
leaving only the inpatient and special ized departments. 
3. An increase in the amount of health budge;t al located to health 
centres and dispensaries. 
Provision of incentives f o r doctors at r e f e r ra l f a c i l i t i e s 
(hospitals), to v i s i t health centres regularly to deal with 
di f f icult cases there. 
/ 
-
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5. Strenghening the diagnostic capabi l i t ies of health centres. 
5. Introduction of models of drug supply (such as the k i t system 
in Kenya) that would ensure ava i lab i l i t y o f essential drugs in 
health centres and sispensaries. 
Due to the fact that in £c 'c l t : i"°ngovernment health f a c i l i t i e s , 
other sources of treatment are available to the population, i t i s important 
for health planners to know the proportion of patients who need referral 
services that seeks treatment from non-government f a c i l i t i e s . This in-
formation is useful in planning the l eve l o f service t o provide at 
government health f a c i l i t i e s . 
VIII Summary and COrtlusion 
Government health services in developing countries are provided 
predominantly through organizational structures with vert i ca l referral 
systems. An important phenomenon of these structures is the movement 
of patients (or their problems) up or down a hierarchy of re ferra l 
faci l it ies. The referral system can be viewed as a physical , organiza-
tional construction of how patients actually seek treatment f o r their i l l -
nesses. A referral system would not work at a l l i f i t were not consistent 
with patients' health-care-seeking behaviour either by chance or by design. 
The vertical r e f e r ra l systems are appropriate organizational 
forms for health services del ivery in resource poor countr ies , not only 
because they are largely consistent with economic behaviour o f patients 
in their search of treatments, but also because they are cos t - e f f e c t ive . 
Nonetheless, the referral systems do not function as desired because of 
certain inefficiencies and inequit ies that characterize them. 
Reforms that would improve the ir performance include re-structuring 
government hospitals so that most of the ir outpatient services can be 
provided at the health centres; making the spec ia l ized medical care at 
referral fac i l i t ies equally expensive f o r everyone without hurting the 
poor; and strengthening the management, and f inancia l pos i t ions of health 
centres and dispensaries. 
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APPENDIX I: THE PROBLEM OF HEALTH SERVICES PLANNING AS THE PATIENTS' 
(HOUSEHOLDS') PROBLEM 
This appendix provides a rigorous treatment f o r the idea that health 
planners and patients, have a common desire t o minimize costs of medical 
care; and that this desire leads them to prefer a r e f e r r a l system of health 
services delivery. 
Planner's Problem-Cum-Patients' Problem 
Assume health planner's budget consists of the time resource, T, and 
othew.resources, R. With th i s resource bundle, the planner is able to 
provide two units of health serv i ces , namely, curative serv ices , X^, and 
preventive services, X^. Since the planner's budget i s l imited, he is 
cost conscious. Spec i f i ca l l y , in providing X^ and X^, i t i s as i f the 
planner is solving the fo l lowing l inenr programming problem: 
Min C = vR + wT. (1) 
s . t 
W 1 + — U1 
vr2 + wt > U2 
v, w > 0 
where 
C = Total cost o f providing X^ and X 
v ;= Price of one unit of resource, R 
w = Price of one unit of resource, T. 
r2» r 2 = Units R required t o produce a unit 
of X^  and a unit o f X^ respect ive ly . 
t^, t 2 = Units of T required to produce a unit of X^ and X2 respectively. 
U l ' U2 = S o c i a l benefits attached respec t ive ly , to u t i l i z a t i o n of X^, and 
X2 by a given population o f households. 
; 
: 
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Like the planner, the households are endowed with time and other 
resources (T* and R* respect ive ly ) that they use to acquire X^ and X .^ 
Since the planner spends his scarce resources to provide X^ and X^, he 
cannot give them f ree of charge to the households. There i s no such 
thing as "free lunch" in the world of the planner. However, households 
(patients) can advance the planner, in form of taxes, some of their 
resources which he can use to provide them with health services. 
Under such arrangement, patients pay only part of the cost o f medical 
services. Assuming R* = R, and the patients advance this much to the 
planner, they would be able to exchange their time resource, T',; for 
medical services when they need them. For s implic i ty assume T* = T. 
Some households and a number of their representatives in their own 
government, regard this arrangement as a "s i tuat ion of f ree services", 
needless tc "say their view is incorrect . When the planner and the 
households are not engaged in health care a c t i v i t y , they bcth work in 
non-health sectors, where they are paia an hourly wage rate of w. It is 
this wage rate, w, which they s a c r i f i c e every time they engage in the health 
care activity. 
services, the planner must receive a compensation of not less w frcm the 
households. Also, in order f o r the households to compensate the planner 
at the rate of w, they must derive benef i ts ( u t i l i t y ) equal at least to w 
from the consumption of medical services . If the households find the 
planner's services (X^ and X^) worthwhile, they spend their limited 
resources, T and R, t o get as much as pussible from these services. 
It should be recalled here that with regard to household's spending 
behaviour, it matters not at a l l whether part of their health budget, R, 
is in the hands of the planner, or in the i r own possession. Given their 
resource constraint, the households can be assumed to spend their 
health budget on X^ and X ^if they are maximizing the fol lowing linear 
programming probleip: 
In order to work in the health sector as a provider of health 
Max W ( 2 ) 
s.t 
2 2 < R 
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where 
W = Utility (Welfare that households derive from consumption of 
X^  and X2« 
U1 = Marginal u t i l i t y of consuming a unit o f X^ and X^ respectively. 
All the other variables , r ^ , r , t^ , t.^, X^, X R , and T are 
defined as in problem ( 1 ) . 
Inspection of expressions (1) and (2) reveals that the planner and 
the households are solving an ident ical problem. S p e c i f i c a l l y , the 
planner is solving the Primal version of an optimization problem, while 
the households are solving i t s Dual or the v ice -versa . By Duality 
Theorem optimal C is equal t o optimal W; a result that confirms indeea 
that both the planner and the householus are engaged in the same problem'". 
Propos it ion: Given the nature f o f their problem, both the planner and the 
households w i l l arrive at a r e f e r r a l system, as the optimal 
system of health services de l ivery . 
Proof: Let S be an set of numbers characterizing various s izes of health 
institutions. Costs of health care in large inst itut ions are 
higher than in small inst i tut ions . 
Let 8 be the proportion of serious i l lnesses in the population, 
and a be the proportion of minor i l lnesses . Assume, as is always 
the case, that a > 3, and that, minor i l lnesses are treated in 
small institutions. 
It follows from behavioural tenuencies sketched in problems (1) 
and (2) that the number of small inst i tut ions in S woulu exceeu 
that of the lar^e ones. Moreover, uue to structure of health care costs in 
S, illnesses woulu be treated in larger inst i tut ions only i f they cannot be 
treated smaller ones. Thus, the se t , S, would represent an oruered 
hierarchy of health inst i tut ions , which, at an abstract . l eve l , bears 
the shape of a pyramid. 
* Notice* that because of nonnegativity r e s t r i c t i o n s , the Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions must hold in order f o r this proLlem to be solved. 
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APPENDIX I I : GLOSSARY OF POSSIBLE REFERRAL SYSTEMS ( P R S ) 
Figure la: PRS-la 
I . ^ 
V I 5 
- 1 © 
\ feT 
( HC f 2 
/ 
• PH , 4 
J . L 
DH i 3 
legend: 1 = Dispensary or Health Post 
2 3 Health Centre 
3 = Dis tr i c t Hospital 
4 = Provincial/Regional Hospital 
5 = National Referral Hospital 
•*• = Direction of formal re ferra l s 
= Possible channels of> informal or se l f referrals 
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Figure lb: PRS-lb 
National Referral Hospital 
PHJ Provincial Hospital 
DH - Dis tr i c t hospital 
RHF^  Rural Health Facility 
Main Features of PRS-lb 
a) Figure la , represents possible geographical locations of healt 
health f a c i l i t i e s that comprise a health care system in a 
typical LDC. 
b) Figure l b , represents an abstract view of th is system, 
a pyramid-like structure of health inst i tut ions . 
c) The system consists of one national r e f e r ra l hospital ; 
many Rural Health f a c i l i t i e s ; and a number of District 
and Provincial hospitals . 
Positive remarks about PRS-1 
a) It corresponds to households pattern of medical responses to illnesses. 
b) It is a common referral system in LDCs 
c) In its present form, i t i s inequitable and i n e f f i c i e n t . 
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Normative remarks about PRS-1 
a) All resource poor countries ought to have some version o f th is 
.y ton 
For most illnesses, households ought to seek medical treatments 
according to its predictions. 
Main Features of the System 
a) An inverted pyramid of a hierarchy of health inst i tut ions . 
b) Many National Referral Hospitals 
c) One or very few Rural Health F a c i l i t i e s 
d) Quite a number of provincial and Dis t r i c t hospitals . 
4) Positive Remarks about PRS-II 
a) It does not correspond to households natural responses to i l lnesses 
b) I* is very expensive, but i t can be af forded. 
c) It has high quality medical care. 
d) It is economically irrat ional 
e) It would be heavily under-uti l ized. 
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Normative statements .about PRS-II 
a) Countries, especially LDCs, ought not to have this system, even when 
they can afford i t . 
technology, households ought t o avoid seeking treatments 
according to the predictions of th i s system. Notice that according 
to PRS-II, households would start seeking treatment, (even f or 
minor illnesses) from very expensive f a c i l i t i e s . 
Main features of PRS-III 
a) It consists of a hierarchy of health ins t i tu t i ons , with an abstract 
shape of sand-glass. 
b) It has many national referral hospitals ; many Rural Health 
Facilities; one or very few Distr ic t hospitals ; and quite a large 
number of provincial hospitals. 
Positive Remarks about PRS-III 
a) It corresponds to households' economic behaviour in their medical 
responses to illness. 
b) Given the nature of most medical problems, and medical care 
Figure 3: PRS-III 
b) It is very expensive; disease patterns in LDCs do not j u s t i f y this 
system. 
; 
• 
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Normative remark about PRS-III 
Given the generally accepted principles o f Primary Health care 
including Community-Based Health Care, low income LDCs ought not to 
have PRS-III. 
Main Features of PRS-IV 
a) It has homogeneous Health F a c i l i t i e s , e . g . , f a c i l i t e s consisting of 
identical hospitals or of ident ical dispensaries. 
b) Referral system in this case is t r i v i a l , because patients would 
bbe moving between identical f a c i l i t i e s . The radi i o f the c i r c l e 
in figure 4 represent probabi l i t ies of cure a f ter r e f e r r a l . As can 
be seen, these probabilities remain the same a f ter r e f e r r a l ; hence 
referral becomes pointless. 
c) There are either many or few health f a c i l i t i e s of uniform s i zes . 
Positive remarks about PRS-IV 
a) It does not correspond to households' medical responses to i l lnesses. 
b) It cannot be justified on the basis o f disease patterns. 
Normative remark about PRS-IV 
H) Figure 1: PRS-IV 
^ y ' 
RHF/Hosp. 
It should not to be installed in any country. 
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5) Figure 5: PRS-V 
Main Features of PRS-V 
a) There are no provincial hospitals 
b) District hospital is the key r e f e r r a l f a c i l i t y in any given community 
in a district . 
c) There is one National Referral hospital (NRH). The NRE deals only 
with special cases which DH cannot handle. . Sel f r e f e r ra l s t o 
NRH are extremely expensive; those trhough DH are f ree or highly 
subsidized. 
d) Referrals are strictly vert ical . 
e) There are high quality, undifferentiated Rural Health F a c i l i t i e s . 
f ) There is only one hospital in a d i s t r i c t . 
g) A District hospital deals only with cases that cannot be treated at RHFs. 
h) Self referrals to DH are very expensive. 
i) There is emphasis on preventive health serv ices . 
% 
Main Features of PRS-VI 
a) There are high quality Rural Health F a c i l i t i e s . Some of these 
however, specialize in certain diseases , e . g . , RHF2 might have a greater 
capabilityo of treating leprosy cases than other rural f a c i l i t i e s . 
Hence other rural faci l ites would be re ferr ing leprosy cases to RHF .^ 
District hospital would also re fer cases to RHF^ 
There is one National Referral H£spital f o r a l l d i s t r i c t s , and one 
Referral hospital in every d i s t r i c t . 
c) There are no provincial hospitals . 
d) There are horizontal re ferra ls . These are r e f e r ra l s from a 
District hospital to another, or from a Rural Health Fac i l i ty to 
another. 
e) Due to differences in epidemiological patterns, some RHFs are 
equipped with medical equipment which are not in others. 
f ) Self-referrals are very expensive. 
g) Descent referrals. These are r e f e r r a l s from a D i s t r i c t hospitals 
to a Rural Health Facility. Due to epidemiological d i f f e rences 
within a district , some RHFs are equipped t o handle some 
diseases better than d i s t r i c t hospi ta ls . There are no descent 
referrals from the National Referral Hospital. 
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Positive remarks about PRS-V'I 
a) It corresponds to households' rat ional responses t o i l lnesses f 
b) It is the optimal system for LDCs since i t has the potent ial to serve 
well the goals of equity and e f f i c i e n c y . 
c) It is consistent with pr inc ip les of Primary Health Care. 
d) It is conducive to community part ic ipation in cost recovery. 
e) It is consistent with po l i cy of "Distr ict Focus" and related 
decentralization pol ic ies . 
f ) It permits referral f a c i l i t i e s to be used mainly by patients who 
need them most. 
It avoids large crowds o f sick people in hospitals most of whom are 
probably lured there by^mirages of cure" at the hospitals . 
Probabilities of infections at the hospitals would a lso dec l ine . 
g) It frees doctors' time from unnecessary r e f e r r a l s , and hence 
gives them an opportunity t o engage in- research, without which 
the referral system would remain s ta t i c . 
Normative Remark about PRS-VI 
LDCs ought to explore seriously, ways o f adopting some version o f PRS-VI, 
taking into account their own s p e c i f i c circumstances. 
